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Many recent papers have pointed to ambiguous trade eﬀects of developing re-
gional trade agreements, calling for a reassessment of their economic merits. We
focus on six such agreements currently in force in Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia and
Latin America, estimating their impacts on trade ﬂows and welfare. We combine
a gravity model with kernel and bootstrap estimation techniques so as to capture
the non-monotonic trade eﬀects while imposing minimal structure. Instead of the
usual dummy variables for RTAs, we propose a new variable, capturing the number
of years of a country’s RTA membership, and we adapt the framework proposed
by Winters (1997) to relate trade eﬀects to their welfare implications. The results
indicate that only AFTA and MERCOSUR have induced positive trade and welfare
eﬀects. The remaining RTAs have produced mixed eﬀects for their members.
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11 Introduction
According to oﬃcial rhetoric, countries involved in a regional trade agreement (RTA
henceforth) expect a welfare gain. This expectation is so strong that most engage
in many diﬀerent agreements leading to what Bhagwati called the “spaghetti bowl”
phenomenon, that is the crisscrossing of many regional agreements diﬀering in their
schedules of phasing out tariﬀs, rules of origin and excluded products. Recent
studies of trade eﬀects of developing RTAs come to diﬀerent conclusions, sometimes
for the same RTAs, as depicted in Table 1.
Table 1: Trade impact of some developing RTAs
Net trade creation Net trade diversion
AFTA/ASEAN Carrère (2004) Dee & Gali (2003)
Elliott & Ikemoto (2004) Soloaga & Winters (2000)
Gosh & Yamarik (2004)
Cernat (2001)
LAFTA/LAIA Dee & Gali (2003) Carrère (2004)
Gosh & Yamarik (2004) Soloaga & Winters (2000)
Soloaga & Winters (2000)
MERCOSUR Gosh & Yamarik (2004) Carrère (2004)
Cernat (2001) Dee & Gali (2003)
Soloaga & Winters (2000) Krueger (1999)
For instance, AFTA, LAIA and MERCOSUR appear to have been net trade
creating in some studies and net trade diverting in others. These studies use dif-
ferent estimation methods, diﬀerent databases and diﬀerent dynamic speciﬁcations
to measure trade eﬀects, and they focus on the number of years these RTAs have
existed to estimate their trade impact. An alternative and interesting approach is
2to evaluate the participation eﬀect of each member: for a given RTA, estimate its
trade and welfare eﬀects on any of its member after a given period of participation,
whatever the oﬃcial date of accession of this member is. We therefore propose
a new RTA variable taking into account the number of years of participation of
each member. In addition, we combine a non-parametric estimation method with
the traditional gravity model to detect potential non-monotonicities in the induced
trade eﬀects. Finally, we establish a connection between trade and welfare eﬀects
where possible. This connection is based on the neoclassical framework proposed by
Winters (1997), adapted to our framework by using some key results of the related
models of regional integration.1
The paper focuses on six developing RTAs covering Subsaharan Africa (ECOWAS
and SADC), Asia (AFTA) and Latin America (CACM, CAN and MERCOSUR)
over the period 1960-1996, and two developed RTAs (EU and NAFTA) for the sake
of comparison.2 We ﬁnd that the trade and welfare impacts of developing and devel-
oped RTAs can evolve non-monotonically over time. The results on RTAs created
in the 1990s seem to indicate that the ﬁrst years of participation to an RTA are
rewarded by a positive welfare eﬀect for the members, and sometimes for the ROW
too. RTAs created in the 1970s and before seem to depict more varied trade and
welfare proﬁles over time. We also ﬁnd that the trade and welfare eﬀects of most
RTAs under consideration preceded the oﬃcial date of entry into force by one to
ﬁve years.
The remainder of the paper contains a theoretical and an empirical part. In
the theoretical part (section 2), we ﬁrst propose a new variable to represent the
impact of RTAs, taking into account the number of years of participation of each
member, then we present our estimation approach combining a gravity model with
1We acknowledge the extreme simplicity of this framework, but it has the merit of being
coherent with economic theory instead of pure speculation.
2Appendices 1 and 2 describe these RTAs.
3kernel and bootstrap techniques to measure the trade impacts of RTAs, and ﬁnally
we employ analysis of RTAs’ trade and welfare eﬀects proposed by Winters (1997)
as a base for the interpretation of our results. In the empirical part (section 3), we
estimate and discuss the trade and welfare eﬀects of the selected developing RTAs
and compare them to the results obtained for developed-country RTAs. Section 4
concludes the paper.
2 Theoretical investigation
To measure RTA trade and welfare eﬀects properly, we focus on export ﬂows of
the trading partners in a general equilibrium framework as described in Figure 1.
The subset RTA comprises the member countries of one of the eight RTAs under









Figure 1: A geography of world trade ﬂows
42.1 A new RTA variable
In this paper, we propose a new variable designed to pick up the eﬀect of RTAs.
This variable is a count of the number of years each member has participated,
instead of using the usual RTA dummy variables. Such a measure combines the
expansion dimension of an RTA (the evolution of the membership over time) and
the cumulative cooperation experience of the members over time. For instance, let
us consider the membership of the Central American Common Market (CACM):
El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua created this RTA in 1960, and
Costa Rica joined in 1962. Let us call Y P (i,t) the number of years of participation
of member country i in the RTA at date t. Table 3 illustrates CACM member
participation in 1988, 1990 and 1992.
Table 3: Number of years CACM members have participated
Years of participation: Y P (i,t)
1988 1990 1992 Year: t
El Salvador 29 31 33
Guatemala 29 31 33
Honduras 29 31 33
Nicaragua 29 31 33
Costa Rica 27 29 31
Member: i
To compute the RTA variable, we have to distinguish between the exporter
(country i) and the importer (country j). Each RTA is characterized by three
variables representing respectively export ﬂows from a member to a non-member
(VRTA−ROW), export ﬂows from a non-member to a member (VROW−RTA), and
5export ﬂows between members (VRTA−RTA).3 These variables depend on i, j and
t:
VRTA−ROW (i,j,t) = Y P(i,t) if i belongs to RTA and j does not, 0 otherwise
(1)
VROW−RTA (i,j,t) = Y P(j,t) if j belongs to RTA and i does not, 0 otherwise
(2)
VRTA−RTA (i,j,t) = min{Y P(i,t),Y P (j,t)} if i and j belongs to RTA, 0 otherwise
(3)
To take account of anticipation eﬀects from the beginning of the negotiation of
an RTA to the end of the ﬁrst year of existence, we can start the analysis a certain
number of years ahead of the entry into force of the RTA. We arbitrarily choose
ten years, a time period we assume suﬃcient to capture the eﬀects of anticipation.
Under this hypothesis, the RTA variables become:
∼
V RTA−ROW (i,j,t) = Y P(i,t)+10 if i belongs to RTA and j does not, 0 otherwise
(4)
3Carrère (2004) shows that a proper evaluation of RTAs trade eﬀects requires that one distin-
guish between these three trade ﬂows.
6∼
V ROW−RTA (i,j,t) = Y P(j,t)+10 if j belongs to RTA and i does not, 0 otherwise
(5)
∼
V RTA−RTA (i,j,t) = min{Y P(i,t),Y P (j,t)}+10 if i and j belongs to RTA, 0 otherwise
(6)
These measures help to take into account the variation in membership and the
cumulative cooperation eﬀect over time of the RTA.
2.2 A new estimation approach
Viner (1950) has proposed a way to assess the welfare eﬀect of an RTA by devel-
oping the concepts of trade creation and trade diversion. Meade (1955) extended
Viner’s approach by including demand elasticities that shape post custom union
trade ﬂows in addition to cost structures. Balassa (1967) proposed a “gross trade
creation” measure as a computable version of Viner’s trade creation and trade diver-
sion notions, and Aitken (1973) formulated a gravity model including RTA dummy
variables to estimate Balassa’s measures.
Another innovation of this paper is to combine non-parametric estimation of
these RTA variables with a gravity model so as to capture non-linear time paths.
We proceed in three steps.
First, we estimate a bilateral trade model. Diﬀerent theoretical foundations
have been invoked to justify the use of the gravity model. Deardorﬀ (1995) shows
that both neoclassic and monopolistic competition frameworks lead to a gravity
formulation of bilateral trade models. We will use the simple formulation derived
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where Xijt is country i’s export to country j at period t, Distij is the distance
between country i and j, GDPit is the GDP of country i in year t, POPit is the
population of country i in year t, RERit is the real exchange rate of country i in
year t, t is the time trend so that γ measures the long term eﬀect of time on trade
ﬂows, δ0 is an intercept common to all years and country-pairs, FEi and FEj are
respectively exporter and importer ﬁxed eﬀects common to all, FEt is year ﬁxed
eﬀects, and εijt is an error term.5
Including separately FEi and FEj is theoretically the well suited approach as
emphasized by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) and Baier and Bergstrand (2002)
among others. However, Cheng and Wall (2005) demonstrate that empirically, it
is rather better to include country-pair ﬁxed eﬀects FEij. The alternative gravity
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where FEij is a country-pair ﬁxed eﬀect (with FEij ￿= FEji) common to all years
used to replace the exporter and importer ﬁxed eﬀects FEi and FEj. We can notice
that equation (8) does not contain a distance variable. This is due to the fact that
4This book presents a complete theoretical and empirical literature review of the gravity model.
Equation (7) is based on equation (5.14) on page 145 of the book.
5We use the real exchange rate variable formulation of Soloaga and Winters (2000) deﬁned as:
RERit = e×ΠUS,t/Πi,t where e is the value of 1 US $ evaluated in the currency of country i and
Π is the GDP deﬂator.
8when including country-pair ﬁxed eﬀects, any regressor that is speciﬁc to country-
pairs, such as bilateral distance is absorbed in the country-pair ﬁxed eﬀects and thus
drops out of the estimated equation. Martinez-Zarzoso and Nowak-Lehmann (2003)
and Cheng and Wall (2005) among others propose a two-stage estimation procedure
to address this problem: the ﬁrst stage is a country-pair ﬁxed eﬀects model and in
the second stage, the estimated ﬁxed eﬀects are used as the dependent variable
and the regressors include all the country-pair speciﬁc variables dropped in the ﬁrst
stage. In this paper, we will use equations (7) and (8) for the sake of comparison.
The estimated residuals of these two equations are extracted and used in the
second step, which consists in estimating the dependency of the estimated residuals
from equations (7) and (8) on the three RTA variables described above by using a
kernel regression.6 This non-parametric method allows for a more direct inspection
of the impact of the RTA variables on trade residuals.
Let us consider a scatterplot (xi,yi) to be approximated by a non-parametric
relation f (x) = y. In our case, x will be one of the three RTA variables and y will
be the estimated trade residual. The idea behind the kernel regression is to use
this scatterplot (xi,yi) to estimate the function f (.) from a fraction of the x values
sample that is “near” to x by choosing a band including x. Inside this band, more
weight is given to points near x and less is given to those far away by using a kernel
function denoted K (.). Let us call h the bandwidth of the band including x; the




i=1 K (xi)yi ￿n
i=1 K (xi)
(9)
where n is the number of observations. There are many possible choices for the
6Another possibility is to use the LOWESS function but the kernel approach is relevant and
easier to apply in our case: we have a large number of observations and the dependant variable
(i.e. number of years each RTA member has participated) is equally distributed (year by year).
Deaton (1997) discuss this issue.
9kernel function, which should be positive and integrate to unity over the band. It
should also be symmetric around zero, so that points below x are weighted equally
as those equally distanced above, and it should be decreasing in the absolute value
of its argument. The literature claims that the choice of the kernel function is not
critical (e.g. Deaton, 1997, and Fox, 2004 among others). We will choose the tricube











K (xi) = 0 for
|xi−x|
h ≥ 1.
More important is the choice of the bandwidth that controls the trade-oﬀ be-
tween bias and variance of the estimated trade eﬀects. Since the x variable is the
number of years of participation, we choose a bandwidth h = 1 so as to smooth
trade eﬀects over a one-year period. This kernel method is used to evaluate the
relationship between estimated trade residuals and each of the three RTA variables:
E (εijt|VRTA−ROW (i,j,t)) =
˜
f (VRTA−ROW (i,j,t)). (10)
E (εijt|VROW−RTA (i,j,t)) =
˜
f (VROW−RTA (i,j,t)). (11)
E (εijt|VRTA−RTA (i,j,t)) =
˜
f (VRTA−RTA (i,j,t)). (12)
The third step of our estimation approach is to compute the 95% conﬁdence in-
terval of these non-parametric estimations by using bootstrap techniques. Following
Redding and Venables (2001) who adapt Efron and Tibshirani (1993) bootstrap es-
timations method to the international trade context, we generate 200 samples by
re-sampling over our initial database.7 Then we estimate for each of these samples
7Each bootstrap replication re-samples the 24,806 country-pair observations in the database.
According to Efron and Tibshirani (1993), the conventional number of bootstrap replications to
10the gravity equation, extract the residuals and run a kernel regression on each of the
RTA variables as described above in the second step. These 200 kernel estimations
are used to construct the 95% conﬁdence interval of the estimated trade eﬀects.
2.3 The welfare eﬀects of RTAs
Many empirical papers have addressed the issue of RTA trade eﬀects, but it is diﬃ-
cult to infer welfare eﬀects on RTA members and non-members from these studies,
as pointed out by Tovias (1982), Pelkmans (1983) and Winters (1987) among oth-
ers. Trade economists now recognize that there is no clear mapping between the
trade eﬀects of an RTA and its welfare eﬀects. Most of the papers on this topic
only speculate on the welfare impact of RTAs. Welfare is a complex notion that
may take into account the availability of diﬀerentiated goods for consumers who
love varieties and also the supply of public goods ﬁnanced by taxes and custom
duties. However, some papers rigorously explore the issue of RTAs welfare eﬀects
within some speciﬁc frameworks. The papers by Frankel, Stein and Wei (1993)
and Spilimbergo and Stein (1996) deal with the welfare eﬀect of RTAs in a Com-
putable General Equilibrium framework. The paper by Winters (1997) deals with
the welfare eﬀect of an RTA on non-members building on the competitive neoclassi-
cal model used by Kemp and Wan (1976). Milner, Morrisey and McKay (2005) use
a partial equilibrium method to measure the short term welfare eﬀects of economic
partnership between RTAs.
In this paper, we build on the regional integration theory and the paper by Win-
ters (1997) to propose a connection between trade and welfare eﬀects on members
and non-members. Let us insist again on the fact we acknowledge the extreme sim-
plicity of the approach, that however have the merit of coherence with our general
modelling framework.
be used to estimate a standard error is between 50 and 200. We choose the maximum (200
replications) to obtain a rigorous estimation of the 95% conﬁdence interval.
11Winters (1997) demonstrates that “the two measures that show the direct, nec-
essary and suﬃcient connection to non-members welfare are non-members imports
and non-members terms of trade”, building on Figure 2. Winters goes on to: “...
consider the slope of the welfare surface around the initial equilibrium, E. An in-
crease in imports, shown by vector a, is unambiguously welfare-improving, whereas
an (unrequited) increase in exports (b) is welfare-worsening, as is a balanced increase














Terms of trade line
Figure 2: Non-members welfare: deviations from the initial equilibrium
In the regional trade theory, the welfare impact on the RTA’s members depends
on the intra-RTA export ﬂows and the RTA’s imports from the ROW: increasing
intra-RTA exports combined with increasing imports from the ROW is welfare im-
proving while increasing intra-RTA exports combined with decreasing imports form
the ROW leads to an ambiguous welfare eﬀect. We do not consider the case of a
negative variation in intra-RTA export ﬂows that is inconsistent with the regional
integration theory. Such an outcome could be due to very distorting non-tariﬀ
12barriers, or cumbersome rules of origin leading to a “counter-productive” RTA or
simply a matter of inaccurate trade statistics.
In Winters (1997) model, the welfare impact on the ROW depends on the ROW
imports from the RTA and its terms of trade. Increasing imports from the RTA
are good for the ROW’s welfare while decreasing imports from the RTA are welfare
worsening for the ROW. However, we have to take into account the movement
of the terms of trade line (see Figure 2). Since the slope of the ROW terms of
trade line is the ROW exports price index divided by the ROW imports price
index (PX/PM), the Supply and Demand law helps us to infer on the rotation of
the terms of trade line building on the trade ﬂows XRTA−ROW (exports from a
member to a non-member which also represents imports of a non-member from a
member) and XROW−RTA (exports from a non-member to a member, which also
represent imports of a member from a non-member). An increase in XRTA−ROW
and XROW−RTA suggest a decrease in the imports and exports price index faced
by the ROW, hence an ambiguous rotation of the terms of trade line. An increase
in XRTA−ROW and a decrease in XROW−RTA suggest a decreasing imports price
index and an increasing exports price index, hence an upward rotation of the terms
of trade line, corresponding to a welfare improvement for the ROW. A decrease
in XRTA−ROW combined with an increase in XROW−RTA suggest an increasing
imports price index and a decreasing exports price index, hence a downward rotation
of the terms of trade line corresponding to a welfare deterioration for the ROW. For
decreasing XRTA−ROW and XROW−RTA, the rotation of the terms of trade line is
ambiguous, hence an ambiguous welfare impact on the ROW.
Table 2 combines these results to propose a connection between trade and mem-
ber and non-member welfare. The question mark (?) indicates an ambiguous eﬀect,
the symbol (-) indicates a negative eﬀect, the symbol (+) indicates a positive eﬀect
and the symbol (0) indicates a null eﬀect.
13Table 2: The connection between trade and welfare eﬀects
Trade eﬀects Welfare eﬀects
XRTA→ROW XROW→RTA XRTA→RTA RTA ROW
1 + + + + ?
2 - + + + -
3 0 + + + -
4 + - + ? +
5 - - + ? ?
6 0 - + ? +
7 + 0 + + +
8 - 0 + + -
9 0 0 + + 0
10 + + 0 + ?
11 - + 0 + -
12 0 + 0 + -
13 + - 0 - +
14 - - 0 - ?
15 0 - 0 - +
16 + 0 0 0 +
17 - 0 0 0 -
18 0 0 0 0 0
Let us comment some of the conﬁgurations in this Table. In line 3, the ROW
imports from the RTA does not vary while the terms of trade line moves down, hence
a negative welfare eﬀect on the ROW.8 For the RTA, increasing intra-regional export
8Here, the ROW exports to the RTA increase, which implicitly supposes a decreasing exports
price index, while the ROW imports from the RTA do not vary (no change in the imports price
index), hence a downward rotation of the terms of trade line.
14ﬂows combined with increasing imports from the ROW induce a positive welfare
eﬀect on the RTA members.
In line 5, the ROW imports from the RTA decrease but the terms of trade line
moving is ambiguous, hence an ambiguous welfare eﬀect on the ROW. Concerning
the RTA, increasing intra-regional imports are combined with decreasing imports
from the ROW, hence an ambiguous welfare eﬀect on the RTA members. In line 16,
the ROW imports from the RTA increase while the terms of trade line moves up,
which corresponds to a welfare improvement for the ROW. Concerning the RTA,
since intra and extra-regional imports do not change, there is no impact on the
members’ welfare.
Table 2 helps us to evaluate the welfare impact of the developing RTAs under
consideration. However, let us mention that these welfare results hold only in the
neoclassical framework used by Winters (1997).
3 Empirical Analysis
In this section, we present and discuss the data and estimation methods used to
evaluate the trade and welfare eﬀects of the six developing RTAs under consid-
eration. We comment these eﬀects and compare them to the eﬀects of the two
developed RTAs included for the sake of comparison.
3.1 Data and estimation issues
Our database comes from Rose (2003). We have bilateral export ﬂows among 179
countries over the period 1960-1996.9 The panel is unbalanced but since we are
dealing with ﬁxed eﬀects, the estimators will not be biased because of that. However,
9In fact, the bilateral trade ﬂows in Roses (2003) that comes from the IMF DOTS database
runs until the year 2000 but the volatility of the data is very high after 1996. We tried to correct
this problem by including crisis dummy variables, continent dummy variables, regional dummy
variables and interaction of all these variables but none of these attempts appeared relevant to
correct for this high volatility. This is why we are restricted to the period 1960-1996.
15we perform the Huber/White estimator of the variance to correct for the potential
heteroscedasticity problem due to unbalanced structure of the data. Furthermore,
the existence of zero export ﬂows in the data raises a selection problem that can
be handled by the Heckman two-step approach, which transforms a selection bias
problem into an omitted variable issue by including the Mills ratio as a regressor.10
A statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcient for the Mills ratio conﬁrms and corrects for the
selection bias.
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The estimation of these equations are reported in Appendix 3.11 Speciﬁcation
1 corresponds to equation (13) including exporter/importer ﬁxed eﬀects and Spec-
iﬁcation 2 corresponds to equation (14) including country-pair ﬁxed eﬀects. In the
results presented in Appendix 3, a parameter with an upper index a is signiﬁcant
at the 1% level, that with an upper index b is signiﬁcant at the 5% level and that
with an upper index c is signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
104,340 observations over 143,783 (3%) depict a zero trade ﬂow. For equation (1), the selection
equation explains the dummy variable (1 if non-zero trade ﬂows and 0 if zero trade ﬂows) with
all the regressors included in equation (1) and includes the product of the surface area of the two
trading partners, while for equation (2), we include in addition to the regressors of equation (2)
the surface area of each trading partners separately. We then run the heckman two-step procedure
and estimate the Mills ratio variable.
11We do not report export/importer or country-pair ﬁxed eﬀects and year ﬁxed eﬀects to save
space.
16Both speciﬁcations yield a signiﬁcant and negative coeﬃcient for the Mills ratio,
indicating that without including this variable would under-estimate the impor-
tance of some trading partners. The real exchange rate variables that measure
the competitiveness of the trading partners over time indicate a slight decrease in
competitiveness among the trading partners over the period 1960-1996.
In the second step, we extract the estimated trade residuals from equations (13)
and (14) and run a kernel regression with the tricube weighted function as described
in Section 2.2. The bandwidth is set to h = 1 so as to smooth trade eﬀects year by
year and the number of years each RTA member participated are re-scaled into a
100-grid point scale.
In the third step, we generate 200 samples by bootstrapping the database, and
then re-estimate the gravity equations and extract the trade residuals for each of
these 200 new databases. Then we re-evaluate the kernel regressions (second step
described in Section 2.2): for each of the 100 grid points representing the number
of years each RTA member participated, we obtain 200 estimations of the trade
eﬀects. For each grid point, we use these 200 estimated trade eﬀects to compute
the standard deviation (σ) of the trade eﬀects. Finally, we use these standard
deviations σ to compute the 95% conﬁdence interval of the trade eﬀects deﬁned as
±1.96 × σ.
The results are presented in Appendix 4. The speciﬁcation using exporter/importer
ﬁxed eﬀects yields relatively high intra-RTA trade ﬂows, suggesting a bias of the
estimated trade eﬀects. This is probably due to the fact that equation (13) does
not include all the relevant bilateral variables mentioned in the literature (common
language, common border, common colonizer, etc.). This problem is corrected in
equation (14) including a country-pair ﬁxed eﬀects that control for all these bilat-
eral variables. The trade eﬀects obtained are more stable, which is in line with
Cheng and Wall (2005) . The following comments restrict on the speciﬁcation with
17country-pair ﬁxed eﬀects.
3.2 The trade and welfare eﬀects of some developing RTAs
The ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (AFTA) was created in 1992 by six members
of the Association of South East Asian Nations (Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia,
Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand), four other members joined subse-
quently (Vietnam in 1995, Laos and Myanmar in 1997, Cambodia in 1999). Figure
3 of Appendix 4 plots the estimated trade residuals against the AFTA member-
ship evolution over time: the top panel focuses on intra-AFTA trade residuals
(XAFTA−AFTA), the middle panel focuses on AFTA residual imports from the
ROW (XROW−AFTA) and the bottom panel focuses on AFTA residual exports to
the ROW (XAFTA−ROW). The dashed lines represent the estimated 95% conﬁdence
interval. These graphs clearly show an anticipation eﬀect for AFTA members which
started increasing their imports from and exports to the ROW ﬁve years before the
oﬃcial year of creation of this RTA. The welfare implication of AFTA corresponds
to line 10 in Table 2, which implies a positive welfare impact on its members and an
ambiguous welfare impact on the ROW. This means that as the number of years of
participation in AFTA increases, AFTA members enjoy an improvement of welfare,
a result that suggests a positive impact of this RTA.
The Central American Common Market (CACM), was created in 1960 by El
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua. Costa Rica joined in 1962. It is notiﬁed
at the WTO as a customs union. Figure 4 of Appendix 4 plots the estimated trade
residuals against the number of years of each CACM member’s participation. Two
years before its creation until seven years after, the intra-CACM export ﬂows were
negative, which corresponds to the “abnormal” case we did not include in Table 2.12
12In fact, the CACM collapsed in 1969 after a ﬁve-day war that had been known as the “soccer
war” between El Salvador and Honduras. After this episode, the partners tried to slowly re-
establish their collaboration. This may explain the “abnormal” trade eﬀects observed. We may
also notice that in Figure 4 of appendix 4, the CACM trade ﬂows are limited to two years before
18This conﬁguration also appears around the 31st year of participation. Abstracting
from these cases, Figure 4 depicts two interesting conﬁgurations corresponding to
lines 6 and 3 of Table 2. Between the seventh and the thirtieth years of participation,
the CACM induces an ambiguous welfare impact on its members combined with a
positive welfare impact on the ROW. After the thirty-second year of its members’
participation, this RTA starts inducing a positive welfare impact on its members,
and a negative welfare impact on the ROW.
The Andean Community (CAN) is a preferential agreement signed in 1988 by
Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela. Figure 5 of Appendix 4 plots
the estimated trade residuals against the number of years of member participation.
There is no clear anticipation eﬀect depicted on these graphs, but the creation of
the CAN seems to have had a clear impact on its members trade ﬂows. The im-
provement of the intra-RTA trade ﬂows was however associated with a continuous
decrease in their imports from and exports to the ROW. Figure 5 reveals the se-
quence of two conﬁgurations corresponding to lines 4 and then 1 of Table 2. After
ﬁve years, the CAN appeared to have induced an ambiguous welfare impact on its
members, combined with a positive welfare impact on the ROW. However, after
this ﬁfth year of participation, CAN members started enjoying a positive welfare
impact while the ROW was facing an ambiguous welfare eﬀect.
The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is a political as-
sociation created in 1975 by ﬁfteen members (Mauritania withdrew in 1999): Benin,
Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau,
Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo. Figure 6 of Appendix 4
plots the estimated trade residuals against the number of years these countries have
participated in ECOWAS. These graphs indicate a slight anticipation eﬀect on the
intra and extra import ﬂows of ECOWAS members ﬁve years before the oﬃcial date
the oﬃcial date of entry into force (1962 for Costa Rica) because the database used is limited on
the period 1960-1996.
19of creation. We then observe a sequence of four conﬁgurations corresponding to lines
10, 3, 14 and ﬁnally 18 of Table 2. For ECOWAS members, this suggests a positive
welfare eﬀect followed by a negative and ﬁnally a null welfare eﬀect, while for the
ROW, this corresponds to a succession of ambiguous and negative welfare eﬀects.
It seems that after a good start, the ECOWAS induced a global negative welfare
eﬀect along with an increase in the number of years each member participated.
The Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) was established in 1991 between
Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay. Figure 8 of Appendix 4 plots the es-
timated trade residuals against the number of years of member participation and
indicates that MERCOSUR members were very involved in intra-trade at least ﬁve
years before the oﬃcial RTA’s date of implementation. Figure 8 reveals a sequence
of three conﬁgurations corresponding to lines 7, 3 and then 1 of Table 2. This result
suggests that MERCOSUR has had a positive welfare impact on its members as
their years of participation kept increasing, while the positive welfare eﬀect initially
induced on the ROW later became negative and ﬁnally ambiguous.
The last developing RTA considered is the South African Development Commu-
nity (SADC), which is a political association created in 1992 by fourteen members:
Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius,
Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia,
Zimbabwe. Figure 10 of Appendix 4 plots the estimated trade residuals against
the number of years of SADC member participation. As in the other Figures
mentioned in this section, the top panel focuses on intra-SADC trade residuals
(XSADC−SADC), the middle panel focuses on SADC residual imports from the
ROW (XROW−SADC) and the bottom panel focuses on SADC residual exports to
the ROW (XSADC−ROW). Figure 10 reveals an anticipation eﬀect of SADC mem-
bers depicted by a continuous increase in the intra-SADC trade ﬂows more than
ﬁve years before the oﬃcial implementation date. This RTA depicts a sequence
20of conﬁguration corresponding to lines 8 and 5 in Table 2, a result that suggests a
positive and then ambiguous welfare impact on its members coupled with a negative
and then ambiguous welfare eﬀect on the ROW.
For the sake of comparison, we also consider two developed RTAs: the EU and
the NAFTA. Figures 7 and 9 of Appendix 4 plot the trade impact of these RTAs
against the number of years their members participated. Figures 7 and 9 indicate
an anticipation eﬀect of both the EU and the NAFTA since their members seemed
to be very involved in intra-regional trade before their oﬃcial date of accession to
these RTAs. The EU depicts a sequence of conﬁguration corresponding to lines 3,
then 7 and 3 again while the NAFTA is represented by line 2 only. These results
suggest a positive welfare impact for the EU and the NAFTA on their members
combined with a negative welfare eﬀect on the ROW.
4 Conclusion
This paper proposes three contributions to the ex-post evaluation of RTAs. First,
we use a new variable to evaluate RTA trade impacts that takes into account the
number of years each member has participated. Second, we combine traditional
gravity regressions with non-parametric estimation techniques that help to inves-
tigate the trade eﬀects without imposing structural forms in advance. Finally, we
build on the paper by Winters (1997) and the theory of regional integration to
propose a broad connection between trade and welfare eﬀects.
We focus on a panel of six developing RTAs covering Africa, Asia and Latin
America. Developing RTAs created in the 1990s (AFTA, CAN, MERCOSUR,
NAFTA and SADC) generally exhibit positive trade and welfare eﬀects during the
ﬁrst years of participation for the members, and sometimes for the ROW too. RTAs
created in the 1970s and before (CACM, ECOWAS and EU) appear to have had
21alternating positive and negative trade and welfare eﬀects as the number of years of
participation of the members increased. More speciﬁcally, AFTA and MERCOSUR
appear to have induced positive and increasing trade and welfare eﬀects for their
members. The results also suggest that most of the RTAs under consideration were
anticipated some ﬁve years before the oﬃcial date of implementation.
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25APPENDIX
Appendix 1: A panel of developing RTAs
Agreement Full name Membership evolution Type
ECOWAS Economic 1975: Benin Political
Community of 1975: Burkina Faso Association
West Africa 1975: Cape Verde












Agreement Full name Membership evolution Type
CAN Andean 1988: Bolivia Preferential




26Agreement Full name Membership evolution Type
SADC South African 1992: Angola Political
Development 1992: Botswana Association












Agreement Full name Membership evolution Type
AFTA ASEAN Free 1992: Brunei Darusalam Political









27Agreement Full name Membership evolution Type
CACM Central American 1960: El Salvador Customs




Agreement Full name Membership evolution Type
MERCOSUR Southern 1991: Argentina Customs
Common Market 1991: Brazil Union
1991: Paraguay
1991: Uruguay
Appendix 2: EU and NAFTA
Agreement Full name Membership evolution Type
NAFTA North American Free 1994: Canada Free
Trade Agreement 1994: Mexico Trade
1994: USA Agreement
Agreement Full name Membership evolution Type
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Figure 9: NAFTA trade eﬀects
36